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“Be bright and lively in expounding; if you can’t expound, 
then pound it in.”. . . these words of the poet are the highest 
maxim for constitutional transformation through judicial in-
terpretation.1 
– Georg Jellinek 
INTRODUCTION 
he European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) is a constituted 
treaty body, created by States and charged with the exercise of 
public governance functions over and above them. Formally established 
as a judicial organ of the Council of Europe (“CoE”), the ECtHR is 
charged with adjudicating disputes under its discrete constituent instru-
ment—the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”). 2  The 
Court is not only relatively autonomous, essentially independent of both 
its Member States and the larger CoE; it is moreover extraordinarily dy-
namic. Indeed it has undergone a constitutional metamorphosis over its 
storied sixty-year tenure, resulting in a body significantly more autono-
mous, independent, and robust in its maturity.3 Certain important chang-
                                                                                                             
 1. GEORG JELLINEK, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
TRANSFORMATION (1906), reprinted in WEIMAR: A JURISPRUDENCE OF CRISIS 54, 56 (Ar-
thur Jacobson & Bernhard Schlink eds., 2000) [hereinafter JELLINEK] (invoking Goethe: 
“In Auslegen seid Frisch und munter, legt ihr’s nicht aus, so leget was unter). 
 2. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
pmbl, art. 19, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]. While the Court is in 
an important sense an organ of the CoE, it is treated here in isolation from the broader 
organization. The Court is a more or less autonomous arm of the CoE, which vindicates 
the rights enshrined in its discrete constituent instrument (the European Convention on 
Human Rights (“ECHR”). While it maintains some marginal links to the Council, (the 
latter acts as a forum for the States Parties to elect judges, for example), the European 
Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) is basically independent. See id.; Brochure, ECtHR, 
The Court in brief (2010), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/DF074FE4-
96C2-4384-BFF6-404AAF5BC585/0/Brochure_en_bref_EN.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 
2012). The Court may thus be best characterized as a quasi-independent “international 
judicial body,” linked to the CoE, but with a relatively hermetic constitutional position in 
the larger organization. See Cesare Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial 
Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 709, 711–13 (1999) (ex-
amining independent international courts as “international judicial bodies” in isolation 
from their wider institutional contexts for certain analytical purposes). To the extent that 
this Article is about constitutional change, it is essentially concerned with the transfor-
mation of the ECtHR in its relations with its Membership, and only indirectly the larger 
CoE. 
 3. See Romano, supra note 2, at 713–16, 726, 728.; see generally Eyal Benvenisti & 
George W. Downs, Prospects for the Increased Independence of International Tribunals, 
T
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es to the Convention have been achieved through formal amendment by 
the States Parties—for example the restructuring of the Court in 1998 
(Protocol 11)4 and 2010 (Protocol 14).5 At the same time, however, the 
constitution of the ECtHR has undergone a quieter, informal kind of de-
velopment through the Court’s own practice in the discharge of its nor-
mal functions. Though the latter mode of change may attract less atten-
tion than the former, the degree of change involved can be just as dra-
matic. 
This paper is about informal change in the constitution of the EC-
tHR—what might be called constitutional transformation, in contrast to 
formal constitutional amendment. In general, by constitutional change I 
mean to connote either the reordering of an organization’s internal archi-
tecture (regarding the relations between, and relative competences of, the 
various organs) or the expansion or limitation of the powers of the organ-
ization as a whole, vis-à-vis the States Parties, the international commu-
nity at large, or even individuals directly. Unlike formal amendment, 
which occurs through the express decision of the member States accord-
ing to a certain procedure, informal transformation occurs more subtly, 
through the practice of the organs of the organization coupled with the 
practice (or even acquiescence) of the Parties.6 
The ECtHR is, of course, essentially a judicial body. As such the focus 
here is on the transformative effect of the Court’s interpretive practice—
specifically its practice in interpreting its own constituent instrument, the 
ECHR. In the international context, treaty interpretation is supposed to 
proceed according to a set of positive legal rules codified in Articles 31 
and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”).7 The 
                                                                                                             
12 GERM. L.J. 1057, 1073–74, 1076 (2011); Benedict Kingsbury, International Courts: 
Uneven Judicialization in Global Order (N.Y.U. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working 
Paper No. 259, 2011), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/259. 
 4. Protocol No. 11 to ECHR, May 11, 1994, E.T.S. No. 155 [hereinafter Protocol No. 
11] (abolishing the European Commission on Human Rights, allowing individuals to 
apply directly to the Court, and giving compulsory jurisdiction to the Court over all dis-
putes arising out of the ECHR). 
 5. Protocol No. 14 to the ECHR, , May 13, 2004, C.E.T.S. No. 194 [hereinafter Pro-
tocol No. 14] (establishing a “single-judge” procedure to increase efficiency, whereby 
initial admissibility decisions may be made by one judge, rather than by committee of 
three judges, as well as providing for enhanced enforcement mechanisms in connection 
with the CoE—such as issuing interpretations of past judgments and/or ruling on a Re-
spondent Party’s compliance with adverse judgments (both upon referral by the Commit-
tee of Ministers of the CoE)). 
 6. See JELLINEK, supra note 1, at 54–57. 
 7. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31–32, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]. 
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techniques of interpretation codified in these two articles (“Vienna 
Rules”) belong to general international law—they exist independently of 
and externally to any particular international organization. Yet the Vien-
na Rules provide the default legal framework for the interpretation of an 
organization’s constituent instrument. If at first blush the rules appear to 
constrain an international judicial body’s discretion in interpreting its 
charter, it should be borne in mind that the rules themselves are subject 
to interpretation.8 I attempt to demonstrate, below, how the ECtHR has 
construed certain aspects of the Vienna Rules in an exceptionally broad 
fashion—thereby justifying a quite unrestrained and expansive approach 
to the interpretation and reinterpretation of the ECHR. I want to suggest 
that in doing so the ECtHR has brought about the gradual transformation 
of its constitution. 
An objection may be raised at the outset that nothing about the Court’s 
interpretive practice is truly transformative in any way specific to its 
constitution. The ECtHR interprets the rights of the Convention as hav-
ing remarkable breadth—even explicitly interpreting them as capable of 
evolution beyond the confines of the plain meaning of the text or the 
Court’s own prior case-law.9 But from a strictly juridical point of view it 
may be said that the Court is simply engaged in treaty interpretation, as is 
its proper function.10 From this perspective, the Court is acting well with-
in the letter of its formal competence even in dramatically expanding the 
rights under its jurisdiction.11 Rights expansion or limitation does not 
necessarily mean constitutional transformation; it is indeed a normal and 
necessary part of the function of all courts charged with rights-
adjudication.12 Yet the transformative potential of the ECtHR’s interpre-
                                                                                                             
 8. See Kingsbury, supra note 3, at 1–2 (“It is something of an international law myth 
that there is one unified approach to interpretation that is embodied in the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties and shared among all tribunals.”). Kingsbury adds that 
“[t]he sociology of those practicing in particular courts, and the wider constituencies for 
those courts, is also important.” Id. at 2. To these considerations might be added the 
structural capacities of the different courts—not only their competences but also their 
power and authority. 
 9. See e.g., López-Ostra v. Spain, 303-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶¶ 51, 58 (1994). 
 10. See ECHR, supra note 2, art. 32. 
 11. Id. arts. 19 & 32. (granting the Court full and final authority to interpret the Con-
vention). 
 12. See e.g., J.H.H. WEILER, Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Boundaries: On 
the conflict of Standards and Values in the Protection of Human Rights in the European 
Legal Space, in THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE 102, 102–29 (1999); Lucas Lixinski, 
Treaty Interpretation by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Expansionism at the 
Service of the Unity of International Law, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 585 (2010); George Letsas, 
Strasbourg’s Interpretive Ethic: Lessons for the International Lawyer, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
509 (2010). 
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tive practice can be thrown into relief from a different, political perspec-
tive on its constitution—focusing on the powers of a constituted treaty-
body over its constituent States.13 The question, from this perspective, is 
not whether the Court’s interpretation does or does not expand a Conven-
tion right, but rather whether its approach to interpretation entails a novel 
assertion of authority over the States Parties. 
This article argues that the Court’s broad construction of the Vienna 
Rules has had a significant political impact beyond justifying an expan-
sive approach to rights-interpretation. The way in which the Court goes 
about interpreting the ECHR entails an assertion about its competences 
vis-à-vis the States Parties—one which gets to the constitutional core of 
the Court’s powers and has led to the gradual transformation of its con-
stitution over time. In order to sharpen the focus, I confine the analysis 
here to the Court’s use of a single technique of interpretation—VCLT 
Article 31(3)(c)14—in a recent landmark case concerning the freedom of 
association:15 Demir & Baykara v. Turkey (2008).16 It is not my intention 
to draw any rigid conclusions from a single case study; rather, I hope that 
a close and multifaceted reading of this important case will simply illus-
trate the hypothesis that the Court’s interpretive practice can have trans-
formative constitutional effects. 
I want to demonstrate, through analysis of Demir & Baykara, two dis-
tinct dimensions of the Court’s approach to interpretation under 31(3)(c). 
On the one hand, the case entails a dramatic evolutive treaty interpreta-
tion, whereby the Court relies on VCLT 31(3)(c) to expand the substan-
tive rights of the Convention in light of sources external to the Conven-
tion. On the other hand, the Court gives VCLT 31(3)(c) itself an aston-
ishingly broad construction to justify considering an extraordinary array 
of external sources—thereby reflexively transforming its own material 
competence to develop the Convention on the basis of developments out-
side of the Convention. In other words, from a juridical point of view, 
Demir & Baykara may simply appear as an expansive, but not outlandish, 
evolutive interpretation of the ECHR. From the political perspective, 
however, it represents a critical shift in the powers of the Court to hold 
the States Parties to legal instruments beyond their control. 
                                                                                                             
 13. Julian Arato, Constitutionality and Constitutionalism beyond the State: Two Per-
spectives on the Material Constitution of the United Nations, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 
(forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Arato, Constitutionality and Constitutionalism]. 
 14. VCLT, supra note 7, art. 31(3)(c) (“[T]here shall be taken into account, together 
with the context…any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations be-
tween the parties.”). 
 15. ECHR, supra note 2, art. 11. 
 16. Demir & Baykara v. Turkey, App. No. 34503/97, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 54 (2008). 
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A. The Transformative Potential of VCLT 31(3)(c) 
Integration and dynamism are in fashion in the world of scholarship on 
the law of treaties. Recent interest in the rules of interpretation focuses 
on the possibility of dynamic interpretation and especially the problems 
and possibilities of interpretation in light of developments in the interna-
tional normative atmosphere external to the treaty. One particular provi-
sion of the VCLT has enjoyed the limelight—the imperative Article 
31(3)(c)—requiring that in the process of interpretation “there shall be 
taken into account, together with the context . . . any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties.”17 But 
what does this vague and open-textured language counsel? 
Article 31(3)(c) has two broad and interconnected aspects: on the one 
hand it is an interpretive mechanism for “systemic integration,” permit-
ting connections and harmonization between different legal regimes; on 
the other hand it justifies a degree of “evolutive” or “dynamic” interpre-
tation over time.18 The idea of the former is that a treaty must be applied 
and interpreted both “against the background of the general principles of 
international law,”19 and by reference to other treaties where appropri-
ate.20 The raison d’etre of this principle, according to the Fragmentation 
Report of the International Law Commission (“ILC”), is the reality of 
ever-proliferating treaties and their ever-growing potential for conflict 
and legal fragmentation.21 The point of systemic integration is to promote, 
as much as possible, harmony among regimes through interpretation.22 
The idea of the “evolutive” aspect of 31(3)(c) is that under some circum-
stances a treaty should be interpreted in light of the normative environ-
ment of the present day, not the historical international legal system con-
temporaneous to the treaty’s promulgation—even if this entails develop-
                                                                                                             
 17. VCLT, supra note 7, art. 31(3)(c). 
 18. Study Group of the Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law ¶ 430, 
Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (by Martti Koskenniemi) 
[hereinafter Fragmentation Report]. 
 19. ARNOLD DUNCAN MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 466 (Oxford Univ. Press 1961). 
 20. See, e.g., Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 279 (2005); Bruno Simma & 
Theodore Kill, Harmonizing Investment Protection and International Human Rights: 
First Steps Towards a Methodology, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY 680, 682, 695, 698–702 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009). 
 21. Fragmentation Report, supra note 18, ¶¶ 414–17. 
 22. Id. 
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ing the instrument in ways not envisioned by, or arguably even at appar-
ent odds with the text.23 
The two aspects of VCLT 31(3)(c) are connected and codependent. 
The propriety of interpreting and reinterpreting a treaty in light of chang-
es in external international law depends on whether an intention to render 
the treaty susceptible of evolution can be imputed to the parties—on the 
basis of the treaty’s object and purpose24 or by inference from the termi-
nology employed (e.g. the incorporation of scientific, technical, or highly 
general terms).25 Conversely, even where such evolutive intent may be 
imputed to the parties, their mere “original intention” cannot provide, of 
itself, the treaty’s new substantive meaning.26 A dynamic interpretation 
grounded on VCLT 31(3)(c) should derive the treaty or treaty provision’s 
new meaning from the external sources considered—dynamism in the 
service of integration. 
Article 31(3)(c) has been well studied as a technique of interpretation 
to achieve integration among regimes of international law—by providing 
for the consideration of external norms, and in some cases justifying a 
dynamic interpretation on their basis.27 What has received much less at-
tention is the auto-transformative effect of the use of Article 31(3)(c) by 
international courts and tribunals in the interpretation of their own con-
stituent instruments. The way a court construes its interpretive mandate 
under VCLT 31(3)(c) is connected to its understanding of its own com-
petences: to what extent does it consider itself competent to consider 
sources external to the treaty it is charged with interpreting? And to what 
extent does it assert competence to hold the Member States to external 
                                                                                                             
 23. Id. ¶ 478; McLachlan, supra note 20, at 316–19.; RICHARD GARDINER, TREATY 
INTERPRETATION 225, 276 (2009). 
 24. See Iron Rhine Railway (Belg. v. Neth.), 27 REP. INT’L. ARB. AWARDS 35, 73 
(2007). 
In the present case it is not a conceptual or generic term that is in issue, but ra-
ther new technical developments relating to the operation and capacity of the 
railway. But here, too, it seems that an evolutive interpretation, which would 
ensure an application of the treaty that would be effective in terms of its object 
and purpose, will be preferred to a strict application of the intertemporal rule. 
Id.; see also Rosalyn Higgins, Time and the Law: International Perspectives on an Old 
Problem, 46 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 501, 519 (1997). 
 25. Fragmentation Report, supra note 18, ¶ 478. 
 26. See Julian Arato, Subsequent Practice and Evolutive Interpretation: Techniques 
of Treaty Interpretation over Time and their Diverse Consequences, 9 LAW & PRAC. 
INT’L CTS. & TRIBS. 443, 466 (2010) [hereinafter Arato, Subsequent Practice]. 
 27. See, e.g., Fragmentation Report, supra note 18, ¶¶ 424–80; Philippe Sands, Trea-
ty, Custom and the Cross-fertilization of International Law, 1 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. 
L.J. 85, 101 (1998); Simma & Kill, supra note 20, at 696–96. 
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norms to which they have not clearly given their consent? By pushing the 
limits of the technique, a court can dramatically expand its competence 
to consider legal materials beyond the treaties to which it has supposedly 
been confined. Put another way, in the interpretive practice of interna-
tional judicial bodies 31(3)(c) can act as a driver of constitutional trans-
formation. In its approach to this technique, the ECtHR has engaged, 
consciously or not, in the transformation of its constitution. 
B. Transformation in the ECtHR: Demir & Baykara  
Demir & Baykara represents, on its face, the Court’s exercise of one of 
its primary functions—the adjudication of complaints by individuals 
against Member States over the substantive rights in the Convention. The 
case concerns a dispute over Turkey’s refusal to recognize the right of 
municipal civil servants to form a trade union, and the Turkish Court’s 
annulment ex tunc of a collective agreement reached by one such union 
through collective bargaining with the municipal employing authority.28 
The question before the Court was whether these two actions violated 
Article 11 of the ECHR, guaranteeing the freedom of association.29 The 
case turned on the construction of Article 11—does it apply to municipal 
civil servants as employees of the State?30 And in the absence of any ex-
press reference, does it imply a right to bargain collectively?31 In decid-
ing the case in favor of the Applicants, the Court relied on external 
sources via VCLT 31(3)(c).32 The Court both narrows a provision in Ar-
ticle 11, excepting some public officials from the exercise of the right,33 
and reads a right to bargain collectively into Article 11 in direct opposi-
tion to its prior case law.34 
The case is illustrative, for present purposes, because it represents both 
dimensions of the Court’s use of VCLT 31(3)(c). As a matter of treaty 
interpretation, the Demir & Baykara Court interpreted the substance of 
Article 11 dynamically and expansively on the basis of developments in 
external sources. At the same time, from a constitutional perspective the 
Court’s extremely broad construction of VCLT 31(3)(c) marks (and jus-
tifies) an implicit assertion of competence to consider an extraordinary 
variety of external international and regional sources. Such sources range 
                                                                                                             
 28. Demir & Baykara v. Turkey, App. No. 34503/97, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 54, ¶¶ 2, 3 
(2008). 
 29. Id. ¶ 59. 
 30. See id. ¶ 53. 
 31. Id. ¶ 147. 
 32. Id. ¶¶ 65–68. 
 33. See ECHR supra note 2, art. 11(2). 
 34. Demir, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶¶ 2, 3. 
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from universal and binding hard law to external conventions neither 
signed nor ratified by the respondent State, and even to intrinsically non-
binding (or “soft”) sources. The case is transformative in that it repre-
sents a qualitative shift in the Court’s line of jurisprudence gradually ex-
panding the ambit of VCLT 31(3)(c)—by giving normative weight to 
standards, recommendations, and non-binding interpretations generated 
by purely external international organizations in the interpretation of the 
ECHR.35 Demir & Baykara thus represents an assertion of competence to 
hold the Member States to norms they did not consent to, and cannot 
strictly control. Demir & Baykara demonstrates the transformative po-
tential of this interpretive technique in the hands of an international judi-
cial body engaged in interpreting its constituent instrument: by giving 
VCLT 31(3)(c) a broad construction, the ECtHR expands its own judicial 
competence to consider (and give weight to) a variety of extrinsic legal 
and quasi-legal sources. 
In the following section I briefly sketch what I mean by the constitu-
tional transformation of an international organization. In section two, I 
examine the ECtHR’s interpretation of the freedom of association in 
Demir & Baykara. I attempt to demonstrate how the Grand Chamber 
relies, there, on VCLT 31(3)(c) to expansively develop Article 11 of the 
ECHR in light of external rules of international law. In section three I 
examine what the Court takes to be legitimate extrinsic sources under 
VCLT 31(3)(c). I argue that the Court asserts an expansive competence 
in this regard on the basis of a surprisingly broad construction of 
31(3)(c)—a construction which ultimately appears decisive in Demir & 
Baykara. By employing a particularly inclusive version of the interpre-
tive technique, I argue, the Court asserts a broad competence to develop 
the Convention on the basis of an exceptionally wide array of external 
sources; in doing so the Court may be seen as transforming its constitu-
tional competence vis-à-vis the States subject to its authority. 
                                                                                                             
 35. The Court has gradually expanded its use of VCLT 31(3)(c) through a line of 
previous cases. Marckx v. Belgium represents one of the more dramatic early expansions 
of the technique of interpretation: there the Court interpreted an evolutive term in the 
ECHR on the basis of two external treaties neither signed by all the Parties to the ECHR 
at that time, nor ratifiedby even a majority of them. Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. A) at 330,  ¶ 41 (1979). By 2001, the Court was willing to rely on 31(3)(c) to justify 
interpreting the Convention in light of all types of sources of international law, concern-
ing widely disparate fields of regulation (i.e. not limiting itself to treaties of the same 
“subject matter”). See, e.g., Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 55–
56 (interpreting the ECHR in light of external norms of customary international law con-
cerning sovereign immunity in order to limit the applicability of the Convention). Demir 
& Baykara represents the particularly dramatic and illustrative capstone of this trans-
formative line of jurisprudence. Demir, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶¶ 65–68. 
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I. CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
This Article does not attempt to elaborate a comprehensive theory of 
constitutional change in international organizations. What follows is only 
an analytical sketch of the concept of “the constitution” of an interna-
tional organization. Especially important here are the various modes 
through which such constitutions change over time. To this end, I draw 
two distinctions: (1) between the formal and material constitutions of 
international organizations, and (2) between formal change (amendment) 
and informal change (transformation). The main concern will be the ma-
terial transformative effect of the ECtHR’s interpretation of its formal 
constitution (the ECHR) on the basis of VCLT 31(3)(c). 
A. Formal vs. Material Constitution 
All international organizations, like all States, have a constitution.36 In 
general, an international organization will have a founding instrument 
that defines certain aspects of its normative architecture—for example 
the competences of the organization, the division of powers among its 
organs, and its principles and purposes.37 This solemn document may be 
called the formal constitution.38 Necessarily in writing, a formal constitu-
tion attempts to entrench certain aspects of the organization’s structure, 
and in some cases certain important norms,39 by making them particular-
ly difficult to change (usually via an onerous amendment rule).40 Yet a 
formal constitution is neither a necessary nor a sufficient component of a 
constitution in the full sense of the term.41 Even in the domestic context, 
states like the United Kingdom have no solemn document at all, and yet 
clearly possess a normative structure that articulates how and by whom 
laws shall be passed, interpreted, executed and enforced.42 If the goal of 
constitutional analysis is to understand how a state or organization is 
                                                                                                             
 36. See Arato, Constitutionality and Constitutionalism, supra note 13, Part 2. 
 37. See, e.g., ECHR supra note 2 (establishing the ECtHR); the U.N. Charter art. 1 
(establishing the United Nations); International Labor Organization Constitution, art. 1, 
June 28, 1919, 49 Stat. 2712, 15 U.N.T.S. 35 (establishing the International Labour Or-
ganization). 
 38. See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 124–25, 258 (1949) 
[hereinafter KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY] (articulating the notion of a formal constitution). 
 39. For example, the substantive rights of the ECHR, or the prohibition on the use of 
force and the right to self-defense, codified in the Charter of the United Nations. See U.N. 
Charter art. 2, para. 4 & art. 51. 
 40. HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 222 (Max Knight trans., 2d ed. 1967). 
 41. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY supra note 38, at 124–25, 258. 
 42. See ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (Roger E. Michener ed., Liberty Fund 1982) (8th ed. 1915). 
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“constituted”—how a system provides for the creation, interpretation, 
and application of legal norms, and how powers are delegated, divided 
and delimited—it would seem farcical to ignore foundational norms 
simply because they are not expressed in a solemn charter.43 Likewise, 
even where there is some kind of founding document, no state’s formal 
constitution really articulates the full constitutional structure, especially 
over time. Some norms in the document may fall into desuetude, while 
others are expanded by legislative, executive, and judicial bodies to mean 
all sorts of things—often totally unanticipated by the text and sometimes 
at cross-purposes with other aspects of the document. 
Kelsen thus classically distinguishes the material constitution from the 
purely formal document. The material constitution, in his conception, is 
that set of norms that dictate the methods through which norms are creat-
ed, interpreted, and applied at the highest levels of the legal system.44 
The constitution may consist of a wide array of laws and customs, some 
perhaps enshrined in a document, and others developed through legisla-
tion, judgment, convention, or other practices of the constituted organs of 
government.45 As opposed to the formal document, the material constitu-
tion describes the fundamental normative architecture within which the 
constituted bodies function. 
The material constitution comprehends the full constitution of any or-
ganization. Nothing in it is non-constitutional, and nothing is missing 
from it that is constitutional for that given entity. By contrast, the formal 
constitution is incomplete and may include norms that would not normal-
ly be considered constitutional from the material point of view.46 How-
                                                                                                             
 43. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 35 (1993) (noting of the 
United States Constitution, “If we are to do justice to American realities, we must see that 
effective power is organized on very different lines, that it has a very different genealogy 
from the one set out by our paper Constitution.”). 
 44. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY supra note 38, at 258. 
 45. For example, judicial review in the United States is mentioned nowhere in the 
formal constitutional document—yet the Court’s assertion since Marbury that it has final 
say over the validity of legislation under the constitution would certainly fall into the 
material constitutional structure of the United States. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) (1803) Similarly, though passed as normal legislation by a vote of 50% + 1, the 
Reform Act of 1832 transformed the constitution of the United Kingdom by radically 
overhauling the electoral system to expand representative government. See, e.g., The 
Great Reform Act, 1832, 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 45 (dramatically reforming popular representa-
tion in the House of Commons by eliminating the “rotten boroughs” and significantly 
expanding the size of the electorate); see also JELLINEK, supra note 1, at 54–57. 
 46. See KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY supra note 38, at 125. Consider, for example, the 
18th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution on prohibition which, though formally en-
trenched, had a dubious constitutional status from a material perspective. U.S. CONST. 
amend. XVIII. 
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ever, it bears noting that the formal document may be profoundly im-
portant in material terms, insofar as it entrenches particularly important 
norms and provides for authoritative interpretation or even review. 
Above all the interpretation of the formal constitution can have a pro-
found material effect. But it is crucial to bear in mind that the architec-
ture of any constituted organization will likely entail other unentrenched 
norms of the highest constitutional importance.47 
B. Amendment vs. Transformation 
To borrow Jellinek’s distinction, constitutional change can occur 
through two different modes: amendment and transformation.48 Amend-
ment should be understood to refer only to change of the formal constitu-
tional document occurring through formal procedure (e.g. Article V of 
the U.S. Constitution).49 It is an inherently intentional act, which brings 
about obvious changes in the constitution. 
Unlike amendment of the formal constituent instrument, which de-
pends on the willful use of formal procedures, constitutional transfor-
mation can occur through the more or less intentional (or even uncon-
                                                                                                             
 47. For example, the Acts determining the composition and jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court of the United States surely attain a constitutional status, because they mate-
rially affect the transmission of validity at the highest level of the hierarchy of norms. See, 
e.g., Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (setting the number of Justices at six), and 
Judiciary Act of 1869, 16 Stat. 44 (setting the number at nine). Congress has also at-
tempted to tamper with the jurisdiction of the Court to varying degrees of success. See, 
e.g., Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001–1006, invalidated in 
relevant part by Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 546 U.S. 1149 (2006) (whereby Congress at-
tempted to strip some of the Court’s jurisdiction by providing that “no court, justice, or 
judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas cor-
pus filed by or on behalf of” a Guantanamo Bay detainee). Because these constitutional 
norms are unentrenched, it is possible to pack the Supreme Court or remove its jurisdic-
tion by simple statute—but the ease of making such changes through ordinary legislative 
procedures does not mean that they are any less changes to the constitution. 
 48. See JELLINEK, supra note 1, at 54. 
 49. The issue becomes complicated in a constitutional system lacking any kind of 
formal constitution, like that of the United Kingdom, where willful constitutional change 
must occur through ordinary legislation. I would suggest that such change should be con-
sidered constitutional transformation, and not amendment, but it is worth noting that in 
such systems constitutional change is only possible through transformation—which may 
be more or less willful. The situation could admittedly equally be described the other way, 
by calling a vote of 50% + 1 the material amendment rule. I opt for the first approach, 
however, because there is no way to distinguish willful constitutional amendments from 
more subtle and potentially unconscious transformations in such a system because every 
law is passed by 50% + 1, whether its constitutional implications are understood or not. 
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scious) action of the constituted bodies. 50  Transformation can occur 
through the organs’ exercise of their delegated powers at all levels of the 
system (as opposed to only the constituent level)—through the enactment 
of important legislation, through the actions of the executive, or through 
interpretation by the courts.51 Moreover, it may occur through a variety 
of more subtle means, including longstanding usages, customs, and 
“conventions of the constitution.”52 Unlike amendment, transformation 
does not rely on any particular procedure; it rather connotes an effect of 
material change in the constitutional order, achieved through means other 
than the formal avenues of change. 
It is important to avoid contrasting amendment and transformation in 
terms of degree of change.53 The material effect of a constitutional trans-
formation can be just as profound as any change achieved through formal 
amendment.54 The distinction is not concerned with the extent to which 
amendment and transformation can bring about constitutional change; 
the issue is rather the processes through which such changes occur and 
their relative legitimacy. 
It may not be immediately obvious why a court, in interpreting the 
formal constitution, contributes to a material transformation. Indeed, it 
may seem that the court is not transforming anything, but simply elabo-
rating the text of the formal charter. However, as noted above, a court’s 
interpretative practice should be viewed from two different perspec-
tives.55 From a juridical point of view, even an expansive or evolutive 
interpretation would seem to entail no constitutional change. Such an 
                                                                                                             
 50. By unconscious action I mean to connote actions taken towards some end, but not 
consciously the end of developing the constitution. It is not that the actors involved are 
sleepwalking, but rather that they may not perceive the constitutional implications of 
their actions in the pursuit of other unrelated goals. 
 51. See JELLINEK, supra note 1, at 55 (Jellinek specifically points to the Courts of the 
United States as a critical driver of the transformation of the U.S. Constitution). 
 52. This Article focuses on treaty interpretation as a mechanism for change. Full dis-
cussion of the other informal mechanisms will be confined to another paper, but suffice it 
to note that I mean to refer to constitutional development through non-legal means like 
conventions in the sense employed in British constitutional theory since Dicey. See 
DICEY, supra note 42, ch. XIV; IVOR JENNINGS, THE LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 79–135 
(4th ed. 1952). 
 53. JELLINEK, supra note 1, at 54–55; Sanford Levinson, How Many Times Has the 
United States Constitution Been Amended? (A) <26; (B) 26; (C) 27; (D) >27: Account-
ing for Constitutional Change, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION 13, 18–19 (Stanford 
Levinson ed., 1995). 
 54. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 43. 
 55. See Arato, Constitutionality and Constitutionalism, supra note 13 (elaborating 
more fully on the distinction between a juridical and political perspective in the analysis 
of a constitution). 
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interpretation by a duly authorized court would appear as simply the ex-
pounding of what is already there. But from a political-theoretical per-
spective, the image may appear in a substantially different color. Instead 
of focusing on the juridical question of the normative result of the court’s 
interpretation, the political lens focuses on the court’s understanding of 
its institutional competence underlying its approach to interpretation. 
Where an interpretation entails a new assertion or reordering of judicial 
power—vis-à-vis other organs, or against the governed—the interpreta-
tion can be understood as transforming (or contributing to the transfor-
mation of) the court’s constitution in a politically significant manner.56 
Depending on perspective, then, an interpretation might appear as both 
mere elaboration (juridically) and a dramatic transformation (politically). 
In sum, amendment changes the formal constitution through the inten-
tional use of formal procedures at the constituent level; transformation, 
by contrast, is a material process which entails either willful or unintend-
ed constitutional change, occurring at all levels and through a variety of 
mechanisms ranging from the organs’ expansive exercise of their express 
delegated powers to less formal change over the longue durée. 
C. Constitutional Change in International Organizations 
Formal amendment is surely the most obvious (and uncontroversially 
legitimate) mechanism through which the constitutions of international 
organizations evolve over time.57  But their material constitutions can 
change dramatically through less formal means as well. In some cases 
the constituted bodies may be able to alter or develop the material consti-
                                                                                                             
 56. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) (1803) (wherein the U.S. Su-
preme Court asserted the power of judicial review and invalidation); Kesavananda Bharti 
v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461 (India) (wherein the Supreme Court of India 
asserted the power to review and invalidate duly enacted constitutional amendments). 
Even if these Courts attempted to ground their newly asserted powers in the formal con-
stitution, it would be difficult to deny that these assertions amounted to monumental 
transformations of their respective constitutions in a material sense. Similarly, a Court 
might transform the constitution by dramatically reinterpreting the powers of another 
organ of government. See 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 43, at 42–44 (noting the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s role in the transformation of the legislative power of the U.S. Congress in 
its New Deal jurisprudence). 
 57. To this category we might add amendment and modification according to the 
default rules of the VCLT, Articles 39–41, which provide for amendment in the absence 
of a formal amendment rule, or under certain conditions, the modification of a treaty 
between some of the parties only. VCLT, supra note 7, arts. 39–41. In other words, the 
rules on amendment and modification of treaties in the VCLT may be understood as 
comprising a “default amendment rule” in international law, basically akin to typical 
constitutional amendment and, more importantly, analytically distinct from constitutional 
transformation. Id. 
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tution through the exercise of juris-generative competences (where they 
have them). 58  In other cases such transformation may occur through 
longstanding usages, customs, and constitutional conventions. But espe-
cially important to the constitutional transformation of international or-
ganizations is the interpretation of their constituent instruments as inter-
national treaties—i.e. the interpretation of the constituent instrument by 
the constituted bodies. 
The interpretation of the constituent instrument of an international or-
ganization is expected to proceed under general international law accord-
ing to the rules of treaty interpretation codified in Articles 31 and 32 of 
the VCLT.59 In reliance upon the Vienna Rules, a duly empowered judi-
cial organ of an organization may render an authoritative interpretation 
of its own formal constitution. Insofar as such an interpretation affects 
the normative architecture of the organization, including the division of 
competences among the organs, the relationships among them, or the 
powers of the organization as a whole, it will entail a transformation of 
the constitution in a material sense—even if the interpreter insists that 
the formal constitution always entailed the meaning currently being as-
cribed to it. 
The following sections attempt to illustrate the transformative effect of 
the ECtHR’s approach to interpretation under VCLT 31(3)(c). First I 
elaborate the Court’s dramatic evolutive interpretation of the ECHR in 
Demir & Baykara, as a juridical matter. Second I argue, from a political 
perspective, that the Court’s expansive approach to VCLT 31(3)(c) 
grounds a broad assertion of its own material competence to give weight 
to a surprisingly wide array of external sources in the evolutive interpre-
tation of the Convention. It is this assertion, I contend, that comprises a 
transformation of the material constitution of the Strasbourg Court. 
                                                                                                             
 58. An example is the U.N. Security Council’s recent assertion of competence to 
enact broad, binding norms of general application under Chapter VII (e.g. Resolutions 
1373 and 1540)—on the basis of only its broad mandate to “maintain international peace 
and security” under the Charter. See, e.g., U.N. Charter, arts. 25, 39, 48; S.C. Res. 1373, 
U.N. Doc. S/Res/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); S.C. Res. 1540, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1540 (Apr. 28, 
2004); see also Arato, Constitutionality and Constitutionalism, supra note 13. 
 59. It is true that a constituent instrument may incorporate rules of interpretation as 
lex specialis to the Vienna Rules. VCLT, supra note 7, art. 5 (stating that “[t]he present 
Convention applies to any treaty which is the constituent instrument of an international 
organization . . . without prejudice to any relevant rules of the organization.”). Such rules 
could thus conceivably include interpretive canons as lex specialis to VCLT Articles 31–
32. Id. arts. 31–32. But absent any express provisions to that effect, the presumption is 
that interpretation follows the VCLT, near-universally accepted as reflecting the custom-
ary international law (CIL) of treaty interpretation. Simma & Kill, supra note 20, at 681–
83, 691, 694. 
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II. DEMIR & BAYKARA AS TREATY INTERPRETATION: THE EVOLUTION OF 
THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION  
This section presents Demir & Bakyara by the Court’s own account: as 
an evolutive interpretation of a Convention right on the basis of external 
sources. Dramatic as the reinterpretation may seem, from this juridical 
perspective the case appears to represent no more than the Court’s exer-
cise of its constitutionally delegated function to interpret the Convention 
in light of the international law of treaty interpretation. 
A. Evolutive Interpretation of the ECHR through VCLT 31(3)(c) 
The ECtHR has long considered its Convention to be a living instru-
ment.60 It has argued time and again that the ECHR as a whole, and its 
provisions individually, are susceptible of evolution under certain condi-
tions. In the view of the Court, the Convention may evolve in a variety of 
circumstances. The Court has considered the provisions of the ECHR to 
be capable of evolving in light of changes in the practice of an over-
whelming majority of the Parties (“European Consensus”).61 It has also 
resorted to interpreting particular Convention rights dynamically where 
doing so appears necessary to guarantee that such rights remain practical 
and effective—not merely illusory—in light of changed circumstances 
(“effet utile”).62 Most importantly here, the Court will give the Conven-
tion an evolutive interpretation in light of developments in the interna-
tional and regional normative environment reflecting a more universal, if 
perhaps partially external, consensus about the meaning of the rights in-
corporated in the ECHR (for which the Court relies on VCLT 31(3)(c)).63 
At the same time, the Court insists that its evolutionary approach to the 
Convention is not an interpretive free-for-all. The Court has stated time 
                                                                                                             
 60. See, e.g., Tyrer v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 
31 (1978); Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and the Evolutive Interpreta-
tion of the European Convention on Human Rights, 12 GERM. L.J. 1730, 1731 (2011); 
Erik Bjorge, National Supreme Courts and the Development of ECHR Rights, 9 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 5, 14, 29–31 (2011). 
 61. See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
A) at ¶ 102 (1989). 
 62. See, e.g., Klass v. Germany, App. No. 5029.71, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 34 
(1978). 
 63. Demir & Baykara v. Turkey, App. No. 34503/97, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 54, ¶ 67 
(2008); Soering, 61 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 102. It bears noting that evolutive interpretation on 
the basis of external norms is usually, but not always rights-expanding. For an example of 
a rights-limiting use of VCLT 31(3)(c), see the Court’s case law concerning state immun-
ity: Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 55–56; Fogarty v. United 
Kingdom, 2001-XI, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 35–36; McElhinney v. Ireland  2001-XI, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. ¶¶ 36–37. 
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and again that an evolutive interpretation of the Convention may expand 
certain rights—even dramatically—but it cannot create new rights that 
were not already incorporated in the instrument.64 Not surprisingly, the 
distinction wears somewhat thin in practice. For example in the famous 
case of López-Ostra, the Court read a “right to a healthy environment” 
into the Article 8 “right to a private life,” in spite of the total lack of any 
textual indication that the latter provision relates to the environment.65 It 
is of course perennially debatable whether such a dramatic interpretation 
constitutes the mere illumination of an old right, or the creation of a new 
one. Suffice it to say the distinction is a murky one. 
In sum, the Court has long been willing to develop the Convention to 
bring the substance of its rights into line with external normative devel-
opments. But the stated limit is the set of rights already incorporated in 
the Convention. At least in principle the Court confines evolutive inter-
pretation on the basis of external developments to the illumination and 
expansion of rights in the Convention, and never the creation of new 
rights—however mercurial the distinction appears in practice. 
B. A Dynamic Interpretation of the Freedom of Association  
As noted above, Demir & Baykara concerns a dispute over the right of 
municipal civil servants to unionize and bargain collectively.66 The actu-
al complaint arose out of a judgment by the Turkish Court of Cassation 
concerning a trade union of municipal civil servants formed several years 
prior.67 The ECtHR divided the case into two main issues: (1) the Turk-
ish Court’s refusal to recognize the existence of the trade union on the 
grounds that civil servants lack the right to unionize68 and (2) the Court’s 
annulment, with retroactive effect, of the union’s collective agreement 
with the municipal employing authority, on grounds that there is no right 
to bargain collectively with the State.69  The Court unanimously held 
Turkey in violation of Article 11 of the Convention (the freedom of asso-
ciation) on both counts: for interfering with the right of the applicants to 
form a trade union; and for annulling ex tunc its collective agreement 
                                                                                                             
 64. In Johnston v. Ireland, the Court refused to read Article 12 (the right to marry) as 
including the right to divorce and remarry, stating that the evolutive approach cannot go 
so far as to derive a right that was not included at the outset. Johnston v. Ireland, 112 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 53 (1986). 
 65. López-Ostra v. Spain, 303-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶¶ 51, 58 (1994). 
 66. Demir, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 3. 
 67. Id. ¶ 19. 
 68. Id. ¶¶ 87–127. 
 69. Id. ¶¶ 128–72. 
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with the State.70 In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied heavily on 
Article 31(3)(c) to ground an evolutive interpretation of the Convention 
in light of changing conceptions on labor rights as reflected in interna-
tional and regional instruments.71 
At least on purely textual grounds, the Court’s decision in Demir & 
Baykara was far from a foregone conclusion. Article 11 states, in full: 
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly 
and to freedom of association with others, including the right 
to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his inter-
ests. 
(2) No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these 
rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are neces-
sary in a democratic society in the interests of national securi-
ty or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the 
rights and freedom of others. This Article shall not prevent the 
imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights 
by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the admin-
istration of the State.72 
On its face, the language of ECHR 11(2) plainly qualifies the “every-
one” of 11(1). The two questions before the Court, then, were first, 
whether Turkey could restrict the right of municipal civil servants to un-
ionize on the grounds that as public employees they were members of 
“the administration of the State” whose freedom of association may be 
lawfully restricted; and second, whether the freedom of association in-
cludes the right to bargain collectively.73 
Turkey argued that all civil servants fall within the “administration of 
the State” exception, and therefore their freedom to associate may be 
qualified by the State.74 Moreover, the government contended that even 
if municipal civil servants have an unqualified freedom of association, 
the freedom does not imply ipso facto a right to collectively bargain with 
the State.75 Based purely on the text, Turkey had a perfectly plausible 
                                                                                                             
 70. Id. ¶¶ 2, 3. 
 71. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 60–86 (on the interpretation of the ECHR in light of other interna-
tional instruments), 98–108 (considering external instruments with regard to the question 
of the right for municipal civil servants to form trade unions), and 147–54 (considering 
external instruments in interpreting whether ECHR Article 11 includes a right to bargain 
collectively). 
 72. ECHR, supra note 2, art. 11 (emphasis added). 
 73. Demir, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 59. 
 74. Id. ¶¶ 89–91. 
 75. Id. ¶¶ 134–36. 
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case on both counts (whatever one may think of the substantive issues). 
Turkey’s idea that “administration of the State” includes all state-
employees seems at least as reasonable a linguistic construction as the 
opposing argument, that it includes only those at the higher levels of 
government who administer the state as such. As for collective bargain-
ing, the text says nothing at all.76 More to the point, in its prior jurispru-
dence, the Court expressly held that Article 11(1) does not include a right 
to collective bargaining. In the 1976 opinion in Swedish Engine Drivers’ 
Union v. Sweden, a Chamber of the Court held that Article 11(1) “does 
not secure any particular treatment of trade unions, or their members, by 
the State, such as the right that the State should conclude any given col-
lective agreement with them.”77 The Chamber went on to note that no 
such right is mentioned in the Article, and “neither can it be said that . . . 
it is indispensable for the effective enjoyment of trade union freedom.”78 
Nevertheless the Grand Chamber ruled unanimously against Turkey.79 
The Court held that the Article 11(2) exception to the freedom of asso-
ciation does not necessarily apply to all employees of the state in princi-
ple, and does not cover the particular applicants in Demir & Baykara.80 
Moreover it ruled that the right to form trade unions in Article 11(1) in-
cludes as an essential element the right to bargain collectively.81 There-
fore, the Court held Turkey to be in violation of the Convention on two 
counts: for failing to recognize, and interfering with, the applicant civil 
servants’ right to unionize; and for the annulment of their union’s collec-
tive agreement.82 
The Court reasoned that it could not accept Turkey’s construction of 
the Convention’s text in large part because it was required to interpret the 
ECHR in light of the broader environment of external international and 
regional law.83 In its own words, “The Court, in defining the meaning of 
                                                                                                             
 76. ECHR, supra note 2, art. 11. 
 77. Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union v. Sweden, 20 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 627, ¶ 39 
(1976). 
 78. Id. at 628. 
 79. Demir, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶¶ 2, 3. 
 80. Id. ¶¶ 97, 107. 
 81. Id. ¶ 154. 
 82. Id. ¶¶ 2, 3. 
 83. The Court also considered the practice of the CoE States regarding the right of 
civil servants to organize and the right to bargain collectively, and Turkey’s own practice 
subsequent to the initiation of the complaint in Demir & Baykara. Id. ¶¶ 104, 124, 151, 
165. It is not clear which, if any of these factors were dispositive (though the Court did 
devote more resources to the regional and international instruments than the others). I do 
not want to make the strong claim that the use of VCLT 31(3)(c) was decisive in the dis-
position of the case. The purpose here is only to demonstrate how the Court relies on 
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terms and notions in the text of the Convention, can and must take into 
account elements of international law other than the Convention, [as well 
as] the interpretation of such elements by competent organs.” 84  The 
Court expressly relied on VCLT 31(3)(c) to ground both its narrow con-
struction of ECHR 11(2) and its evolutive interpretation expanding 
ECHR 11(1) to include collective bargaining—to bring the ECHR in line 
with the evolving norms of international and regional labor law. 85 
Regarding the first issue, concerning who enjoys the right to organize, 
the Court held that the exception in Article 11(2) permitting the re-
striction of the freedom of association of “members . . . of the admin-
istration of the State” must be construed narrowly in light of international 
and regional instruments reaffirming the right of public workers to un-
ionize.86 Looking to the external normative environment, the Court de-
termined that only the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights provides an apparent exception regarding the restriction 
of the right to organize like that of the ECHR concerning “members of 
the administration of the State.”87 By contrast, most international instru-
ments including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the relevant instruments of the International Labor Organization 
(“ILO”) recognize an unqualified right of civil servants to form trade 
unions (limiting exceptions to the police and armed forces).88 The Court 
                                                                                                             
external rules and principles, through the mechanism of VCLT 31(3)(c), to justify ex-
panding the Convention—whether or not it makes use of other justifications. There is no 
use in speculating whether the outcome of the case was over-determined, or whether the 
Court’s consideration of these regional and international instruments may not have been 
decisive on their own. 
 84. Demir, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 85 (emphasis added). 
 85. Id. ¶ 67 (“[T]he Court has never considered the provisions of the Convention as 
the sole framework of references for the interpretation of the rights and freedoms en-
shrined therein. On the contrary, it must also take into account any relevant rules and 
principles of international law applicable in relations between the Contracting Parties . . . 
see also Article 31 § 3 (c) of the Vienna Convention.”) (emphasis added). Careful reading 
reveals two variations between the ECtHR’s rule and the phrasing of 31(3)(c): the Court 
adds that it will consider “principles” in addition to rules of international law, and quali-
fies “parties” with the designation “Contracting.” Id. Both of these variations are material 
to the Court’s expansive application of 31(3)(c), and shall be revisited in Part IV. 
 86. Demir, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 2. 
 87. Id. ¶ 99 (citing International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
art. 8(2), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3). 
 88. Id. ¶¶ 99–102. Here the ECtHR considers: International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, art. 22, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Int’l Labour Org. [ILO] Con-
vention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (ILO 
No. 87), art. 2, July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17; ILO Comm. of Experts on the Application 
of Conventions & Recommendations [CEACR], Individual Observation concerning Con-
vention No. 87, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, 1948 
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further found that regional European instruments confirm the latter 
view,89 with the most recent of them, the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union, going the furthest—stating in Article 12(1) that 
“everyone” without qualification has the right to form and join trade un-
ions.90 
The Court determined, on the basis of the above sources, that the gen-
eral rule in regional and international labor law holds that public officials 
enjoy the right to organize and form trade unions.91 Turning to the Con-
vention, the Court reasoned via VCLT Article 31(3)(c) that ECHR Arti-
cle 11 should be interpreted as being in line with the external internation-
al standards as much as the text allows; the exceptions in Article 11(2) 
must be strictly construed.92 Thus, in the opinion of the Court, civil serv-
ants are not ipso facto “members . . . of the administration of the 
State.”93 Only those civil servants actually “engaged in the administra-
tion of the State as such” can be subjected, on the basis of 11(2), to a lim-
itation of their right to form trade unions.94 The Government had failed, 
in the opinion of the Court, to show that municipal civil servants in Tur-
key belonged to the narrow exempted category.95 
                                                                                                             
Turkey (2002), ILO Doc. No. 062002TUR087 [hereinafter CEACR, Individual Observa-
tion] (“Article 2 of the Convention provides that workers without distinction whatsoever 
should have the right to form and join organizations of their own choosing and that the 
only admissible exception under the Convention concerns the armed forces and the po-
lice.”); ILO COMM. ON THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION [CFA], DIGEST OF DECISIONS AND 
PRINCIPLES ¶ 217 (4th ed. 1996) (“Local public service employees should be able effec-
tively to establish organizations of their own choosing, and these organizations should 
enjoy the full right to further and defend the interests of the workers whom they repre-
sent.”). 
 89. Demir, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶¶ 103–04; see European Social Charter, art. 5, Oct. 18, 
1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89, E.T.S. No. 35 (permitting partial restrictions on police, and total 
or partial restrictions on the armed forces, but not for members of the administration of 
the state more broadly); Comm. of Ministers of the Council of Eur., Recommendation No. 
R (2000) 6 of the Comm. of Ministers to member states on the status of public officials in 
Eur., princ. no. 8  (Feb. 24, 2000), available at 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=340693&Site=CM (declaring that public officials 
should, in principle, enjoy the right to organize subject only to lawful restrictions so far 
as is necessary for the proper exercise of their public functions). 
 90. Demir, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 105 (citing Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, art. 12(1), 2000 O.J. (C 364) 11). 
 91. Id. ¶¶ 96–108. 
 92. Id. ¶¶ 97, 107–08. 
 93. Id. ¶ 107. 
 94. Id. ¶ 97. 
 95. Id. ¶¶ 107, 108, 154. The Court added that even if Turkey had shown that the 
applicants belonged to the group “members of the administration of the state,” the gov-
ernment would not be able to simply deny such workers the right to organize out of 
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As to the second issue, the Court’s opinion with regard to collective 
bargaining was even more dramatic because it represented an outright 
departure from prior case law. The Court did not explicitly reverse its 
earlier decision in Swedish Engine Drivers; rather it held that the Con-
vention had evolved in the intervening years in light of developments in 
external law. The Court first looked to international sources, focusing 
above all on ILO Convention No. 98 concerning the Right to Organise 
and to Bargain Collectively.96 The ILO Convention enshrines workers’ 
right to collectively bargain through their associations. True, the Court 
notes, Convention No. 98 states that it “does not deal with the position of 
public servants engaged in the administration of the State.”97 However, 
the Court stresses, this exemption provision has been interpreted narrow-
ly by the ILO’s Committee of Experts to exclude only those officials 
who are directly employed in the administration of the State—not all 
public officials as such (parallel to the Court’s own interpretation of the 
application of Article 11 to public servants).98 The Court thus expressly 
relied here upon Convention No. 98 as interpreted by the ILO Commit-
tee of Experts.99 In addition, the Court found that certain European in-
struments confirm the right of all unions to bargain collectively, includ-
ing those representing public servants—relying in particular on the Eu-
ropean Social Charter (Article 6(2)) and the European Union’s Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (Article 28).100 In light of these developments, the 
Court opted to reconsider its case law on whether the right to bargain 
collectively constitutes an inherent element of Article 11 of the ECHR 
“so as to take account of the perceptible evolution in such matters.”101 In 
light of developments in regional and international law, the Court held, 
                                                                                                             
hand—it would have to demonstrate that such restriction of the particular applicant’s 
rights was, inter alia, “necessary in a democratic society,” (11(2)) which Turkey had 
failed to do. Id. ¶¶ 119–27. The Court stressed, after all, that the “exceptions set out in 
Article 11 are to be construed strictly.” Id. ¶ 97. In determining necessity, the Court con-
tinued, “States have only a limited margin of appreciation.” Id. ¶ 119. 
 96. Id. ¶ 147. 
 97. Convention Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise 
and to Bargain Collectively art. 6, July 1, 1949, ILO No. 98, 96 U.N.T.S. 257 [hereinafter 
ILO Convention No. 98]. 
 98. Demir, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 43; see ILO, Comm. of Experts, General Survey of 
the Reps. on the Freedom of Association and the Right to Organise Convention (N. 87), 
1949 and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Conventions (No. 98), 1949,  
¶ 200, 81st Sess. (1994) [hereinafter ILO, General Survey], available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/P/09661/09661(1994-81-4B).pdf. 
 99. Demir, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 147. 
 100. Id. ¶¶ 149–50. 
 101. Id. ¶ 153. 
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Article 11 has come to include today what it did not in 1976: “the right to 
bargain collectively with the employer has, in principle, become one of 
the essential elements of the ‘right to form and to join trade unions for 
the protection of [one’s] interests’ set forth in Article 11 of the Conven-
tion.”102 
In reaching both conclusions, the Court’s interpretation amounted to a 
dramatic evolutionary interpretation of the Convention on the basis of 
VCLT 31(3)(c). Regarding the rights of public workers, the Court’s in-
terpretation thoroughly narrowed a textual restriction on the freedom to 
associate—expanding the right’s ambit to cover most public employees. 
The imputation of the right to collectively bargain represented an even 
more expansive and more explicit development of the Convention. In 
both instances, the Court relied on 31(3)(c) to develop the Convention 
progressively—to bring it into line with the broader framework of inter-
national labor law. 
III. DEMIR & BAYKARA AS CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION: AN 
EXPANSION OF COMPETENCE THROUGH CONSTRUCTION OF 31(3)(C) 
A closer examination of Demir & Baykara illuminates the more com-
plex and reflexive constitutional meaning of the Court’s interpretive ap-
proach. The case is illustrative, not simply of how the ECtHR expansive-
ly interprets the Convention on the basis of external rules, but as a thor-
ough articulation of the Court’s approach to applying VCLT 31(3)(c) 
more generally. Indeed Demir & Baykara reflects the Court’s assertion 
of a broad competence to consider a wide array of external sources in 
determining whether and how to dynamically interpret the Convention, 
grounded in an extraordinarily broad construction of the technique of 
treaty interpretation codified in VCLT 31(3)(c). The Court’s auto-
expansion of its competences represents a significant transformation of 
its material constitution. 
The issue is not whether the Court is or is not formally competent to 
consider external sources—under the express terms of the Convention, 
that question is for the Court to decide. Article 32(1) of the ECHR for-
mally delimits the competence of the Court, granting it jurisdiction over 
“all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Conven-
tion and the Protocols thereto.”103 The immediately following paragraph 
makes clear that it is for the Court itself to decide precisely how far 
ECHR 32(2) extends: “In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court 
                                                                                                             
 102. Id. ¶ 154. 
 103. ECHR, supra note 2, art. 32(1). 
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has jurisdiction, the Court shall decide.”104 Thus, as a formal matter the 
constituent instrument of the ECtHR expressly grants the Court judicial 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz—it leaves the Court competent to decide its own 
competence by interpreting its jurisdictional capacity granted by 32(1).105 
The deeper question, in material terms, is what the Court actually makes 
of its open textured competence, and upon what justification. Whether or 
not the auto-expansion of its competences is formally justified, new and 
expansive assertions of such competence may represent a significant 
transformation of the constitution in a material sense. From a juridical 
point of view, it would appear that by considering external sources the 
Court would be simply exercising its competence consistent with its for-
mal constitution. From a political-theoretical perspective, however, the 
more expansively the Court asserts its capacity to consider external 
sources, the more power and authority the Court asserts over those whom 
it governs—the parties to the ECHR. 
As should be clear from the foregoing, the Court considers its compe-
tence to extend to the interpretation of the Convention generally in light 
of the Vienna Rules of interpretation.106 On the basis of 31(3)(c) in par-
ticular, the Court has considered itself competent to interpret the Con-
vention dynamically in light of developments in external rules of interna-
tional law.107 But how far does the Court consider this competence to 
extend? As Demir & Baykara makes abundantly clear, the Court inter-
prets VCLT 31(3)(c) as extremely broad, justifying its reliance on an 
astonishing range of external legal and quasi-legal sources in the inter-
pretation of the Convention. Though formally the Court may have al-
ways enjoyed such a broad formal-juridical competence by virtue of Ar-
ticle 32(2) of the ECHR, what is critical is the material extent to which 
the Court actually asserts its competence. Crucial as well is how the 
Court justifies said assertion—on the basis of and in terms of the interna-
tional law of treaty interpretation. 
To illustrate the full breadth of the ECtHR’s construction of 31(3)(c) in 
Demir & Baykara, it is helpful to break the rule down into its elements. 
                                                                                                             
 104. Id. art. 32(2). 
 105. See J.H.H. WEILER, The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order, in THE 
CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE, supra note 12, at 286, 312 (distinguishing between two senses 
of Kompetenz-Kompetenz: the legislative Kompetenz-Kompetenz (“the power [of a body] 
to extend its own jurisdiction”) and the judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz (“the power to be 
the ultimate arbiter of disputes concerning the extent of those limited competences”)). 
 106. See Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 35 (1975). 
 107. See, e.g., Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 41 (1979); Al-Adsani v. 
United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 55–56; Fogarty v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI 
Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 35–36; and McElhinney v. Ireland,  2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 36–37. 
2012] CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE ECTHR 373 
The Article, to repeat, states that “There shall be taken into account, to-
gether with the context . . . (c) any relevant rules of international law ap-
plicable in the relations between the parties.”108 The scholarship tends to 
treat the rule as having three main components—it is permissible to con-
sider sources that are (i) “relevant,” (ii) “rules of international law,” and 
(iii) “applicable in relations between the parties.”109 Each of these com-
ponents may be read on a gradient from narrow to broad. As Demir & 
Baykara makes clear, the ECtHR’s expansive approach pushes the limits 
of each element of the rule. This broad construction of Article 31(3)(c) 
proves material to the decision in Demir & Baykara, and indeed appears 
decisive with regard to interpreting the right to bargain collectively into 
Article 11. 
A. “Relevant” Rules 
Simma and Kill note that the term “relevant” is an amorphous expres-
sion, “that lends itself to extremes of gradation and a substantive lack of 
clarity.”110 Some suggest that the term should be construed as confining 
VCLT 31(3)(c) to the consideration of only those rules that are “directly 
applicable to the subject-matter of the case.”111 The general consensus in 
more recent scholarship seems to be, however, that relevance cannot be 
so narrowly construed. Gardiner proposes a broader view of the term, “as 
referring to those [rules] touching on the same subject matter as the trea-
ty provision or provisions being interpreted or which in any way affect 
that interpretation.”112 Simma and Kill support the broad view, relying 
largely on the International Court of Justice’s (“ICJ”) use, in the Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters case, of a 1977 Treaty of Friendship, 
Navigation, and Commerce between France and Djibouti as a “relevant 
rule” within the meaning of VCLT 31(3)(c) for the interpretation of a 
1986 Convention between those States on Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
                                                                                                             
 108. VCLT, supra note 7, art. 31(3)(c). 
 109. Simma & Kill, supra note 20, at 695; GARDINER, supra note 23, at 259–60; see 
also Fragmentation Report, supra note 18, ¶ 426. 
 110. Simma, supra note 20, at 695; GARDINER, supra note 23, at 258, 260. 
 111. Henn-Jüri Uibopuu, Interpretation of Treaties in the Light of International Law: 
Art. 31, Para. 3(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 40 ANNUAIRE DE 
L’A.A.A. 1, 4 (1970); MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
TREATIES: A MANUAL ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERRELATION OF SOURCES 
265 (2d ed. 1997). 
 112. GARDINER, supra note 23, at 260 (emphasis added) (including as examples of 
relevance going beyond subject matter, inter alia: completing the legal picture, or filling 
gaps, in a treaty by reference to general international law; deriving guidance from parallel 
treaty provisions; or resolving conflicting obligations arising under different treaties). 
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Matters between them.113 “It is fair to conclude,” in their view, “that trea-
ty interpreters are free to embrace the flexibility inherent in the term ‘rel-
evant.’”114 
With respect to this aspect of the rule, Demir & Baykara does not itself 
reflect a particularly broad approach. The Court considered only external 
sources that could be fairly deemed “relevant” under any construction. 
The various international and European instruments considered all con-
cern the same labor rights at issue in Article 11 of the ECHR—the free-
dom of association and the right to bargain collectively. However it bears 
noting that the ECtHR has elsewhere adopted the broader approach to the 
“relevance” component of 31(3)(c)—most notably in a trio of judgments 
on state immunity.115 In each of those three cases the Court employed the 
same language, reasoning that the Convention must be interpreted in 
light of the Vienna Rules, and in particular “Article 31(3)(c) . . . . The 
Convention should so far as possible be interpreted in harmony with oth-
er rules of international law of which it forms part, including to those 
relating to the grant of State immunity.”116 Thus, the Court considered 
the general international law of immunity relevant to the interpretation of 
the scope of the human rights in the Convention—not because they ad-
dress the same subject but, presumably, to resolve a potential conflict 
between those regimes.117 
                                                                                                             
 113. Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djib. v. Fr.), Judg-
ment, 2008 I.C.J. 177, ¶ 113 (June 4). 
 114. Simma & Kill, supra note 20, at 696. Simma and Kill further note that, for textual 
reasons, VCLT 31(3)(c) should at least be understood as having a broader ambit than 
other treaties with the same subject matter. The term “relating to the same subject matter” 
appears as an express qualifier in Article 30 on successive treaties. Thus, they reason, the 
use of the more general term “relevant” in Article 31(3)(c) should be interpreted in light 
of the choice not to employ the more specific “subject-matter” qualification. Id. at 695–
96. 
 115. Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 55–56; Fogarty v. Unit-
ed Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 35–36; and McElhinney v. Ireland,  2001-XI Eur. 
Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 36–37. 
 116. Al-Adsani, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 55. “It follows,” the Court continues, “that 
measures taken by a High Contracting Party which reflect generally recognized rules of 
public international law on State immunity cannot in principle be regarded as imposing a 
disproportionate restriction on the right of access to court as embodied in Article 6(1).” Id. 
¶ 56; Fogarty, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 35–36; and McElhinney, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 
¶¶ 36–37. 
 117. See Fragmentation Report, supra note 18, at 221, ¶ 438 pointing out that, in these 
cases, the ECtHR “might have simply brushed aside State immunity as not relevant to the 
application of the Convention.” But instead of doing so it took the possibility of conflict 
head on by opting to integrate Article 6 in its normative environment. “The right provid-
ed under the European Convention was weighed against the general interest in the 
maintenance of the system of State immunity. In the end,” the ILC’S Report correctly 
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While the Court does indeed appear to adopt a broader reading of rele-
vance in its case law, it should not be seen as swimming far beyond the 
general understanding of the scope of VCLT 31(3)(c) in this regard, as is 
reflected in recent scholarship and international judicial practice. The 
same cannot be said of the Court’s expansive reading of the remaining 
two elements of the rule. 
B. “Any . . . Rules of International Law” 
The ambiguity of this element—what counts as a rule of international 
law—is a matter of durability: how soft may a norm be or how hard must 
it be to qualify as a rule of international law in the sense of VCLT 
31(3)(c)? Here too the Court adopts a broad construction of the ambit of 
the technique—systematically articulating and extending its broad read-
ing of “rules of international law” in Demir & Baykara. By contrast to 
the Court’s broad reading of “relevance,” however, the ECtHR’s con-
struction of “rules of international law” goes far beyond the positions 
usually articulated in the literature. 
In general the scope of “rules of international law” in VCLT 31(3)(c) 
seems relatively clear. Most scholars agree that it simply reflects the tra-
ditional list of sources codified in the Statute of the ICJ at Article 38(1): 
customary international law, other treaties (subject to their being “appli-
cable”), and general principles of law.118 Most also seem to agree that the 
provision should not extend any further. The Fragmentation Report 
states that the provision refers here to “rules of law, and not to broader 
principles or considerations which may not be firmly established as 
rules.”119 In this regard Simma and Kill warn of the susceptibility of in-
ternational human rights law “to ‘rights creep,’ that is, to ambitious ex-
pansion of the claimed liberties and entitlements cognizable as human 
rights.”120 In light of such tendencies, they contend, “[t]ribunals should 
                                                                                                             
notes, “the Court used article 31(3)(c) to set aside, in this case, the rules of the Conven-
tion.” See also GARDINER, supra note 23, at 260 (arguing that the resolution of potential 
conflicts is a legitimate use of 31(3)(c)). 
 118. Fragmentation Report, supra note 18, ¶ 426; GARDINER, supra note 23, at 267–68; 
Simma & Kill, supra note 20, at 695; McLachlan, supra note 20, at 290–91; see also 
Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing 
of Biotech Products, ¶ 7.67, WT/DS291-293/R (Sept. 29, 2006) [hereinafter Panel Report, 
EC-Biotech] (“Textually, this reference seems sufficiently broad to encompass all gener-
ally accepted sources of public international law, that is to say, (i) international conven-
tions (treaties), (ii) international custom (customary international law), and (iii) the gen-
eral principles of law.”). 
 119. Fragmentation Report, supra note 18, ¶ 426. 
 120. Simma & Kill, supra note 20, at 695. 
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establish that the rights being advanced as external rules of law do in fact 
exist as rules of law.”121 
The ECtHR, however, marches far beyond the border of the list of 
sources in the ICJ Statute. The Court affirms, first, that VCLT 31(3)(c) 
justifies taking into account the traditional sources—customary interna-
tional law, other conventions, and general principles. 122  However the 
Court quickly and stridently goes beyond, articulating systematically the 
wide range of sources it has taken and is currently willing to take into 
consideration for the purposes of interpreting the Convention.  
The Court first looks to the output of other CoE organs, including “in-
trinsically nonbinding instruments” emanating from the plenary repre-
sentative bodies (in which all of the Parties to the ECHR are represent-
ed).123 Here, at least, the Parties to the ECHR retain some voice in the 
promulgation of such instruments, but the Court’s construction of 31(3)(c) 
goes significantly further. The Court asserts competence to consider “in-
trinsically non-binding” norms emanating from other CoE organs, “even 
though those organs have no function of representing States Parties to the 
Convention,”124  including the work of the European Commission for 
Democracy through Law (or “Venice Commission”);125  the European 
Commission against Racism and Intolerance;126 and the Reports of the 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Degrading 
Treatment.127 
                                                                                                             
 121. Id. 
 122. And indeed it has given weight to such sources on several occasions. See, e.g., 
Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 88 (1989) (relying on the 
ICCPR); Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 50–60 (relying on the 
CIL of State Immunity); Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 35 (1975). 
Article 31 para. 3 (c) of the Vienna Convention indicates that account is to be 
taken . . . of “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties”. Among those rules are general principles of law and es-
pecially “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.” 
Id. (citing Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(c), June 26, 1945, 59 
Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993). 
 123. Demir & Baykara v. Turkey, App. No. 34503/97, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 54, ¶ 74 
(2008). The Court has considered, for example, “intrinsically non-binding” recommenda-
tions and resolutions of the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe (“CoE”). See, e.g., Öneryildiz v. Turkey, 2004-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 
¶¶ 59, 71, 90, 93. 
 124. Demir, 48 Eur. H.R.. Rep. ¶¶ 74–75. 
 125. See, e.g., Russian Conservative Party of Entrepreneurs v. Russia, 46 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
863, 873 (2007). 
 126. See, e.g., Bekos & Koutropoulos v. Greece, 2005-XIII Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 33–36. 
 127. See, e.g., Slimani v. France, 2004-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 396, ¶¶ 9, 22–26 (Fr.). 
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Finally, in applying 31(3)(c) to the case at hand, the Court goes beyond 
the CoE regime altogether and considers the non-binding interpretations, 
observations, and recommendations of two committees of the ILO: the 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recom-
mendations;128 and the Committee on the Freedom of Association.129 The 
Court thus extends its use of VCLT 31(3)(c), here, to the consideration of 
the explicitly non-binding product of committees of an international or-
ganization with whom it has absolutely no institutional connection.130 
In Demir & Baykara the Court articulates an expansive list of types of 
sources it considers itself competent to consider, ranging from the hard to 
the very soft. The Court recognizes that it is in principle limited to apply-
ing the Convention; yet it asserts here that it can only do so properly, in 
light of the mandatory terms of VCLT 31(3)(c), if it also considers a 
manifold of international instruments ranging from the hardest treaties to 
the softest recommendations and interpretations by the organs of utterly 
unrelated international organizations. 
C. “ . . . Applicable in the Relations between the Parties” 
The main problem in determining applicability, as framed succinctly 
by the Fragmentation Report, is whether it is “necessary that all the par-
ties to the treaty being interpreted are also parties to the treaty being re-
lied upon as the other source of international law for interpretation pur-
poses.”131 Is it sufficient that the external rule is applicable to the parties 
                                                                                                             
 128. Demir, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶¶ 101, 147 (citing CEACR, Individual Observation, 
supra note 88). 
 129. Id. ¶ 102 (relying on a recommendation of the Committee, see ILO, General Sur-
vey, supra note 98). 
 130. See JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 224–29 
(2005) (noting that such observations and recommendations, though non-binding in a 
legal sense, may exert a strong compliance-pull from the individual States to whom they 
are directed, especially because they are attached to onerous reporting requirements). But 
such political influence aside, these instruments cannot be said to be in any way hard law 
under the public international law doctrine of sources. Id. 
 131. Fragmentation Report, supra note 18, ¶ 470; see also GARDINER, supra note 23, 
at 265 (Gardiner feels compelled to emphasize that here, unlike the other elements of 
VCLT 31(3)(c), there is no hope to resolve the ambiguity in this particular element 
through textual analysis); Simma & Kill, supra note 20, at 696. Simma and Kill suggest 
that the notion of “applicable” actually entails three distinct sub-issues. Beyond the ques-
tion of “which parties,” the term raises the issue of intertemporality—when must the rules 
be applicable, at the conclusion of the treaty or at the time of application/interpretation? 
Id. at 696. And finally, the meaning of applicable “as a legal term of art”—does applica-
ble mean “in force” or “binding,” or something more flexible? Id. at 697. I leave these 
two sub-categories out of the main analysis, here, for distinct reasons. First, as to inter-
temporality, the issue has basically ceased to be controversial. As Simma and Kill them-
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to the dispute? Or must the external rule be applicable to all or even a 
high proportion of the parties to the treaty under interpretation? If the 
latter, coming full circle, is it even necessary that the external rule be 
applicable to the parties to the dispute? The problem becomes particular-
ly acute in the interpretation of multilateral treaties with wide member-
ship.132 Finally, to complicate things exponentially, it might be asked 
whether the rule is the same for all kinds of multilateral treaties? Both 
the scholarship and occasional international judicial decisions on point 
evince a weaker consensus on the meaning of “applicability” than with 
regard to the other elements of VCLT 31(3)(c). And still, Demir & 
Baykara represents a step beyond the broadest constructions generally 
put forth. 
As a preliminary matter, the ambiguity in “applicability . . . between 
the parties” arises mainly in reliance on external treaties because, for the 
most part, general principles and customary international law will be ap-
                                                                                                             
selves recognize, most international courts and tribunals, as well as commentators, today 
recognize the possibility that VCLT 31(3)(c) envisions the possibility of considering 
developments in international law in the interpretation and reinterpretation of a treaty. Id. 
at 696. It may have been generally accepted that treaties were generally static before the 
conclusion of the Vienna Convention. See Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure 
of the International Court of Justice: General Principles and Sources of Law, 30 BRIT. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 5 (1953). However since 1969 the presumption has clearly shifted, re-
placed by the notion that the parties’ intent, as reflected in the terminology employed or 
the treaty’s object and purpose, should control the issue of whether a treaty is susceptible 
of evolutive interpretation. See most recently, the practice of the ICJ in the last two years, 
for example, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 1, ¶ 
145, 171–74 (Apr. 20). While I leave out the issue of intertemporality because it simply 
appears no longer controversial, I omit the issue of applicability because the analysis 
would be redundant. Simma and Kill note that on a purely textual basis the term may 
imply more flexibility than “in force” or “binding.” Simma & Kill, supra note 20, at 697–
98. Note, however, that they advocate caution, insisting that their comments “should not 
be taken as a basis for a liberal doctrine of ‘applicability’ under Article 31(3)(c) without 
further research.” Id. at 698. Nevertheless, problematizing “applicability” in this way 
appears to introduce exactly the same ambiguity as arises in the interpretation of 
“rules”—i.e. is the term flexible enough to include norms of a softer nature? Rather than 
repeat the analysis for each term, suffice it to say that VCLT 31(3)(c) appears to include 
several terms that could, if interpreted flexibly, permit consideration of soft-law. 
 132. Fragmentation Report, supra note 18, ¶ 471.  
Bearing in mind the unlikeliness of a precise congruence in the membership of 
most important multilateral conventions it would become unlikely that any use 
of conventional international law could be made in the interpretation of such 
conventions . . . in practice the result would be the isolation of multilateral 
agreements as ‘islands’ permitting no references inter se in their application. 
Id. 
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plicable to all the parties to the treaty under interpretation.133 It bears not-
ing, however, that analogous issues may arise where the external rule of 
CIL is one to which one or some of the parties are persistent objectors,134 
or where it constitutes a rule of “regional custom” opposable only to 
some of the parties to the treaty.135 But for purposes of clarity I follow, 
here, the general approach in the scholarship to limit analysis of the 
problem of “which parties” to the reliance on external treaties. 
McLachlan helpfully canvasses four possible readings of “applica-
ble . . . between the parties,” representing the views most frequently as-
serted in the fragmented scholarship and judicial opinions construing this 
element of VCLT 31(3)(c).136 The provision, to paraphrase, may 
(a) Require that all parties to the treaty under interpretation 
also be parties to any treaties relied upon (a clear but very 
narrow standard);137 
(b) Permit reference to another treaty provided that the treaty 
parties in dispute are also parties to the other treaty (a 
much broader standard, which runs the risk of engender-
ing inconsistent interpretations of the treaty under inter-
pretation); 
(c) Require that all parties to the treaty also be parties to any 
treaties relied upon (as in (a)) except in case of an external 
                                                                                                             
 133. Simma & Kill, supra note 20, at 698 (“In the case of rules deriving from general 
customary law and general principles, this question of ‘applicability’ presents relatively 
little complication. By their nature, rules originating in these sources are applicable, in-
deed binding, in the relations among all States.”); see also Fragmentation Report, supra 
note 18, ¶¶ 463–69. 
 134. On persistent objectors, see Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. 
116, 130–31 (Dec. 18); Asylum Case (Colom./Peru), Judgment, 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277–78 
(Nov. 20). 
 135. On the possibility of regional custom, having the same general character as cus-
tomary international law but applying only to States of a certain region, see Asylum Case, 
1950 I.C.J. at 277. 
 136. See also McLachlan, supra note 20, at 314–15. 
 137. This most narrow approach has been adopted by a panel of the WTO in EC-
Biotech. Panel Report, EC-Biotech, supra note 118, at ¶¶ 7.70–7.71. 
[W]e think it makes sense to interpret Article 31(3)(c) as requiring considera-
tion of those rules of international law which are applicable in the relations be-
tween all parties to the treaty which is being interpreted . . . . [I]t is not apparent 
why a sovereign State would agree to a mandatory rule of treaty interpretation 
which could have as a consequence that the interpretation of a treaty to which 
that State is a party is affected by other rules of international law which that 
State has decided not to accept. 
Id. 
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treaty that reflects customary international law (under-
standing that this approach may be materially broader 
than (a) because any such “reflective” treaty may entail 
some degree of progressive development of the CIL rule); 
or 
(d) Require, in absence of complete identity between the trea-
ties, that the external rule can be said to be implicitly ac-
cepted or tolerated by all parties to the treaty under inter-
pretation.138 
McLachlan and the Fragmentation Report adopt different approaches 
based on the above, complicated even further by taking into considera-
tion the type of treaty provision being interpreted. McLachlan argues that 
only options (a) and (c) are appropriate, except where the norms of the 
multilateral treaty under interpretation are “bilateral” or “reciprocal” by 
nature, as opposed to “absolute” or “integral” obligations owed erga om-
nes partes (to all of the parties) or even erga omnes (to the international 
community as a whole).139 In other words, if the multilateral treaty is 
composed of a web of reciprocal obligations, then it may be legitimately 
“bilateralized” through interpretation on the basis of external rules appli-
cable to the parties to the dispute, but not necessarily the parties at large, 
without risk of prejudicing the latters’ rights on the basis of obligations 
to which they did not consent.140 The presumption is the narrow con-
struction, except in case of bilateral obligations in multilateral treaties. 
The Fragmentation Report takes the opposite view, insisting that the 
overly narrow positions would pose a serious risk of fragmentation in 
international law.141 “Bearing in mind the unlikeliness of a precise con-
gruence in the membership of most important multilateral conventions,” 
the Report notes with concern, “it would become unlikely that any use of 
conventional international law could be made in the interpretation of 
such conventions . . . in practice the result would be the isolation of mul-
                                                                                                             
 138. McLachlan, supra note 20, at 314–15. Simma and Kill admit that this may be a 
viable interpretation, though stop short of adopting it. Simma & Kill, supra note 20, at 
697–98. Pauwelyn supports the approach in the context of the WTO Covered Agreements. 
JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 257–63 (2003). 
 139. Some examples of integral obligations are entailed by certain treaty provisions 
undertaken by states to protect human rights or in some cases, the environment. See 
McLachlan, supra note 20, at 315; Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties, Third Rep. 
on the Law of Treaties, arts. 18–19, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/115 (Vol. II) 
(Mar. 18, 1985) (by Gerald Fitzmaurice). 
 140. See McLachlan, supra note 20, at 315; Joost Pauwelyn, A Typology of Multilat-
eral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or Collective in Nature?, 14 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 907, 911 (2003). 
 141. Fragmentation Report, supra note 18, ¶¶ 471–72. 
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tilateral agreements as ‘islands’ permitting no references inter se in their 
application.”142 A better view, the Report suggests, is (b) requiring only 
that the external rule be applicable to the parties to the dispute—even at 
risk of divergent interpretations. By way of exception, the Report con-
cedes, where the norm under interpretation is an integral one it should 
not be interpreted in light of external rules not-applicable to all the par-
ties if divergent interpretations of said norm would “threaten the coher-
ence of the treaty to be interpreted.”143 And even then, the Report contin-
ues, the interpreter should consider (d), whether the other parties to the 
treaty have implicitly accepted or tolerated the external treaty rule.144 The 
presumption of the Fragmentation Report is a broad construction of 
VCLT 31(3)(c), except in the case of some integral norms where diver-
gent interpretations would threaten the coherence of the regime and the 
other parties cannot be said to have acquiesced in the external rule not 
formally applicable to them. 
Here too, the ECtHR finds a way to adopt an even broader approach 
than those envisioned in the scholarly debates. Having noted earlier the 
absolute (integral) nature of the provisions of the ECHR,145 the Court 
applies 31(3)(c) to the Convention in Demir & Baykara as permitting the 
consideration of any relevant rules of international law “applicable in 
relations between the Contracting Parties.”146 This may appear a narrow 
construction at first glance (akin to either McLachlan’s approach, or the 
even more narrow construction categorically requiring the identity of 
parties to all treaties involved). However the Court adds an all-important 
proviso: it does not distinguish “between sources of law according to 
whether or not they have been signed or ratified by the respondent 
State.”147 Instead, the Court considers its task under VCLT 31(3)(c) to be 
“searching for common ground among the norms of international law.”148 
To that effect it is not necessary that all the parties to the Convention are 
parties to the external instrument under consideration, nor is it even 
                                                                                                             
 142. Id. ¶ 471. 
 143. Id. ¶ 472. 
 144. Id.; see also PAUWELYN, supra note 138, at 257–63. 
 145. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 90, ¶ 239 (1978) (“Unlike 
international treaties of the classic kind, the Convention comprises more than mere recip-
rocal engagements between Contracting States. It creates, over and above a network of 
mutual, bilateral undertakings, objective obligations.”). 
 146. Demir & Baykara v. Turkey, App. No. 34503/97, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 54, ¶ 67 
(2008). 
 147. Id. ¶ 78. 
 148. Id. 
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“necessary for the respondent State to have ratified the entire collection 
of instruments that are applicable.”149 
It will be sufficient for the Court that the relevant international instru-
ments denote a continuous evolution in the norms and principles ap-
plied in international law or in the domestic law of the majority of 
member States of the Council of Europe and show, in a precise area, 
that there is common ground in modern societies.150 
Sure enough, the Court relies upon several instruments that it acknowl-
edges have not been ratified by Turkey (against the latter state’s predict-
able and express objections),151 including Articles 5 and 6 of the Europe-
an Social Charter,152 and the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (with no small irony, given Turkey’s perennially frustrated at-
tempts to join the E.U.).153 
Thus the ECtHR’s approach in Demir & Baykara represents an ex-
traordinarily broad construction of the final element of VCLT 31(3)(c): 
an integral treaty may be interpreted in light of external norms in spite of 
the fact that some parties to the it, including even the parties to the dis-
pute, have not ratified or signed the external agreement. 
D. Transformation through Interpretation 
VCLT 31(3)(c) entails three main ambiguities: (1) what is the scope of 
“relevant” rules, (2) how hard or soft may these rules be, and (3) to 
which parties must the rule be applicable. In each case the Court has 
adopted a maximally broad reading by not limiting itself to the consider-
ation of rules of the same subject matter, making use of the softest of 
instruments, observations, and interpretations, and taking into considera-
tion rules applicable to only a minority of the Parties to the Convention, 
not even including the Respondent in the particular dispute. And the 
breadth of this approach actually appears more or less decisive in Demir 
& Baykara in determining the second issue, as to whether Article 11 
                                                                                                             
 149. Id. ¶ 86 (citing mutatis mutandis its earlier judgment in Marckx v. Belgium, 31 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 41 (1979)) (not explicitly relying on 31(3)(c), but nevertheless 
taking into consideration two treaties signed by just ten, and ratified by a mere four States 
Parties to the ECHR—treaties which even admit of reservation on the precise point in 
question. The Court took these treaties, recognizing the equal rights of children born out 
of wedlock, as evidence of the evolving views in “modern societies” along with the 
recognition of such right in the “great majority” of CoE States). 
 150. Id. ¶ 86. 
 151. Id. ¶¶ 61–62 (Turkey was not a party to Article 5 (the right to organize) or Article 
6 (the right to bargain collectively), though it had ratified the rest of the Charter in 1989). 
 152. Id. ¶¶ 62, 103, 149. 
 153. Id. ¶¶ 105, 150. 
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(freedom of association) includes the right to bargain collectively, the 
Court relies on only the non-binding interpretations of the ILO Commit-
tee of Experts of Convention No. 98, and two Conventions not ratified by 
the Respondent State—the European Social Charter and Charter of Fun-
damental Rights of the European Union.154 
The Court’s position may be thrown into relief by way of contrast to 
the stark words of the WTO Panel in EC-Biotech. There, the Panel 
framed its concern about a broad reading of “applicable . . . between the 
parties” in terms of State consent. As the Panel stressed, 
It is not apparent why a sovereign State would agree to a mandatory 
rule of treaty interpretation which could have as a consequence that the 
interpretation of a treaty to which that State is a party is affected by 
other rules of international law which that State has decided not to ac-
cept.155 
The ECtHR, in adopting an extraordinarily broad interpretation of the 
ECHR asserts instead, by implication, that in acceding to this particular 
human rights treaty, composed of absolute (integral) norms, the States 
Parties have given up a great deal of their control over which precise ex-
ternal norms of international law they will be bound to obey. 
Demir & Baykara thereby represents, beyond a broad and dynamic in-
terpretation of Article 11, a more reflexive assertion of the Court’s con-
stitutional authority over the States under its charge. Though the exercise 
of such competence may have always been juridically possible under the 
broad terms of the Court’s formal constituent instrument, the assertion of 
said competence in a particular case represents a transformation in the 
material sense. Whether or not the Court always might have been able to 
hold the member States accountable to technically non-binding external 
standards, Demir & Baykara makes clear the Court’s willingness to do so 
today. As such it represents the capstone of transformative line of juris-
prudence. The Court’s interpretive practice under VCLT 31(3)(c), culmi-
nating in Demir & Baykara, demonstrates the critical and politically sig-
                                                                                                             
 154. The only other instrument it considers, ILO Convention No. 151, is not quite 
apposite because it requires States to encourage and promote bargaining with “‘public 
employees’ organisations, or of such other methods as will allow representatives of pub-
lic employees to participate in the determination of these matters.” See Convention Con-
cerning Protection of the Right to Organise and Procedures for Determining Conditions 
of Employment in the Public Service art. 7, June, 6, 1978, ILO No. 151 (emphasis added). 
This seems wholly consistent with the Court’s old rule, in Swedish Engine Drivers, which 
held that Article 11 required the State to give workers’ organizations voice, but not nec-
essarily the right to bargain collectively. Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union v. Sweden, 20 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 628, ¶ 39 (1976). 
 155. Panel Report, EC-Biotech, supra note 118, ¶ 7.71. 
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nificant shift from potentiality to actuality. In other words, from the po-
litical point of view—as against a formal-juridical perspective—this shift 
represents a transformation of the material constitution of the European 
Court of Human Rights. 
CONCLUSION  
I hope to have shown that the ECtHR’s approach to 31(3)(c) has 
grounded not only the dramatic expansion of certain Convention rights, 
but also a more reflexive transformation of the Court’s constitution. The 
two dimensions of its interpretive approach are mutually reinforcing: 
first the Court relies on a broad construction of VCLT 31(3)(c) to justify 
its assertion of competence to consider an extraordinarily wide variety of 
external sources in interpreting the Convention, ranging from clearly ap-
plicable law to quasi-legal instruments and external interpretations; and 
secondly it actually relies on the full panoply of such sources, via VCLT 
31(3)(c), to develop the substantive rights of the Convention through 
highly expansive and dynamic interpretation. In short Demir & Baykara 
illustrates how the Court has relied on a maximally broad construction of 
VCLT 31(3)(c) to both expand the substantive rights of the Convention, 
and transform its constitutional competences. 
Formally speaking it might be said that the Court always had, in prin-
ciple, the broad competence to authoritatively interpret the Convention as 
it sees fit on the basis of the ECHR alone. It has, after all, the formal 
competence to decide for itself the extent of its jurisdiction in the inter-
pretation of the Convention—i.e. judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz. 156 
However two points remain critical. First, it is already crucial to note 
how the court actually makes use of its capacious formal competence. 
Through its interpretive practice, the Court’s competence to apply an 
enormous array of external rules is not merely a formal-juridical possibil-
ity, but a political fact. Second, and equally importantly, the Court does 
not assert its broad competence to interpret the Convention in light of 
external sources by simple fiat—resting on its broad grant of interpretive 
competence. Rather it articulates and justifies its broad assertion of com-
petence to develop the Convention in light of such myriad sources on the 
basis of the codified international law of treaties. It at least attempts to 
legitimate its assertion of broad competence in legal terms—by appeal to 
the general international law of treaty interpretation as codified in the 
Vienna Convention. The Court justifies its expansive assertion of compe-
tence on the basis of a remarkably, but not impossibly, broad construc-
tion of its obligations as an interpreter under VCLT 31(3)(c). 
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Ultimately, the Court is here asserting a competence over and above 
the States Parties. It claims the competence to consider, in the expansive 
and evolutionary interpretation of the Convention, what it perceives to be 
trends in international, regional, and domestic mores as evidenced by an 
array of hard and soft law, irrespective of whether states have agreed to 
be formally bound by those instruments or whether the instruments were 
even meant to be binding. The Court is thereby saying that it is more 
concerned with developing the Convention in light of trends in “modern 
societies” writ large, than in light of the immediate consent of the States 
Parties to any given change. In other words, if it considers a state to be a 
laggard, measured against contemporary international human rights 
standards, the Court will not be dissuaded from giving the Convention an 
evolutive interpretation in light of those standards by cries of the absence 
of state consent.157 By signing on to the absolute and objective obliga-
tions of the ECHR, the Court reasons, the Parties have given up plenary 
control over the extent of their human rights commitments. 
I hope to have illustrated one way in which international organizations 
rely on the general international law of treaty interpretation to expand 
their competences. In conclusion, I propose two areas for further research. 
First, I want to emphasize that this study of Demir & Baykara has been 
intended to merely illustrate a process of informal constitutional change 
through interpretation—a process that has occurred elsewhere, and will 
in all probability continue to occur in international organizations much 
more generally. The story does not end with either the ECtHR or VCLT 
31(3)(c). A similar phenomenon can be perceived in other courts and 
tribunals with regard to other codified techniques of treaty interpretation 
over time—as, for example, the ICJ’s reliance on an expansive interpre-
tation of VCLT 31(3)(b) in reinterpreting, and arguably modifying, its 
constituent instrument, the U.N. Charter. VCLT 31(3)(b) requires the 
consideration of “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty 
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpreta-
tion.”158 In Certain Expenses the Court read this provision as permitting 
it to consider, when interpreting the constituent instrument of an interna-
tional organization, the “practice” of that organization’s organs (where 
                                                                                                             
 157. Indeed in Demir & Baykara the Court explicitly ruled out Turkey’s objection that 
it could not indirectly give effect to external legal sources to which Turkey had not con-
sented to be bound through expanding the Convention on the basis of VCLT 31(3)(c) (i.e., 
in particular, Articles 5 and 6 of the European Social Charter). See Demir & Baykara v. 
Turkey, App. No. 34503/97, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 54, ¶¶ 61–62, 78, 86 (2008). 
 158. VCLT, supra note 7, art. 31(3)(b). 
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coupled with the acquiescence of the Parties).159 The Court relied on this 
construction of VCLT 31(3)(b) again in the later Namibia opinion, in 
order to justify its famous interpretation (or by many accounts modifica-
tion) of Article 27(3) of the Charter.160 On the basis of the longstanding 
practice of the Security Council, the Court reasons that the Article’s re-
quirement of the concurring votes of the five permanent members of the 
Council for passing a Resolution includes either an affirmative vote or an 
abstention—i.e. the absence of a negative vote. The jurisprudence of the 
ICJ thus illustrates a transformation similar to that effected by the EC-
tHR through 31(3)(c)—the ICJ asserts a broad construction of 31(3)(b), 
and relies on that construction to dramatically interpret (and arguably 
modify) its constituent instrument. In so doing, it asserts a broad compe-
tence to develop the Charter through interpretation in light of “the prac-
tice of the organization.”161 
The practice of other international courts and tribunals in interpreting 
their own constituent instruments may thus provide a fruitful area for 
further research, specifically with respect to how they rely on the various 
techniques of transformative interpretation over time—including subse-
quent agreement (VCLT 31(3)(a)), subsequent practice (VCLT 31(3)(b)), 
and evolutive interpretation based on either object and purpose (VCLT 
31(1)), or external rules (VCLT 31(3)(c)). 
I want to suggest, finally, that one court’s expansive construction of 
VCLT 31(3)(c), or any other technique, might have normative ripples 
beyond its own regime. The second area for future research thus con-
cerns a horizontal issue of interpretation across treaty regimes: to what 
extent do (or might) various courts and tribunals rely on one another’s 
constructions of the Vienna Rules of treaty interpretation to develop their 
own constituent instruments?162 Howse and Teitel have demonstrated the 
high level of dialogue among the ever-proliferating international courts 
and tribunals,163 and I have argued elsewhere that such courts rely on one 
                                                                                                             
 159. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 157 
(July 20); see also Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶¶ 26–27 (July 9). 
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the context of investor-state arbitration). 
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another’s construction of the contours of various techniques of interpre-
tation over time.164 Moreover, there can be no doubt that scholars rely 
heavily on international case law in expounding the meaning of the vari-
ous techniques of interpretation. Through such dialogue, a once astonish-
ing construction may be normalized over time. 
Taking these further questions together, I want to suggest by hypothe-
sis that it is possible to trace the development, through the practice of 
international courts and tribunals interpreting their own constituent in-
struments, of a more or less general use of interpretive techniques to ef-
fect constitutional transformation. What bears further research is both 
how this process differs in different international courts and tribunals; 
and whether and to what extent horizontal dialogue between these diffuse 
courts acts as a catalyst in this process—particularly to what extent judi-
cial bodies rely on one another’s constructions of the various techniques 
of interpretation over time in the interpretation of their own constitutions. 
                                                                                                             
 164. See, for example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ reliance on the 
ECtHR’s judgment that human rights treaties, by virtue of their object and purpose, are 
susceptible of evolutive interpretation. The Right to Information on Consular Assistance 
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